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Note
INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR ORANGE BOOK
CORRECTIONS AND THE FDA’S MINISTERIAL ROLE:
A NEED FOR REFORM
JANE F. DJUNG
The Hatch-Waxman Act revolutionized the prescription drug industry
by streamlining the process for generics to gain FDA approval. The Act is
credited as the primary source of infusing generics into the present day
pharmaceutical landscape. However, overly broad use codes provided by
the brand drug manufacturers for publication in the Orange Book may
preclude generic manufacturers from a section viii statement, which may
severely impede the healthcare consumer from access to affordable
generic drugs.
Although the FDA is responsible for publishing the Orange Book, it
does not review its substantive information. As a result, generic companies were left without a mechanism to challenge an overly broad use
code that may prevent or impede the launch of a generic drug. As a patch
for this procedural hole, Congress introduced the counterclaim provision
as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003. However, to invoke the counterclaim
provision, the generic company must engage in a cumbersome process as
highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in Caraco Pharmaceuticals v. Novo
Nordisk.
This Note explores the road to the counterclaim provision, examines
the Supreme Court’s construction of the counterclaim provision, and
highlights Justice Sotomayor’s illuminative remarks. Finally, this Note
argues for elevated FDA oversight and proposes requiring use codes to be
identical to the FDA-approved use, provided that the approved method of
use is within the scope of the patent claims.
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INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR ORANGE BOOK
CORRECTIONS AND THE FDA’S MINISTERIAL ROLE:
A NEED FOR REFORM
JANE F. DJUNG∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Generic prescription drugs are a vital component of the national
healthcare landscape. Since the introduction of the revolutionary Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19841colloquially
known as the Hatch-Waxman Actthirty years ago, generic drugs have
impacted the prescription drug market by providing affordable necessary
drugs to the public, saving American consumers, taxpayers, and federal
and state governments trillions of dollars.2 Prescription generic drugs have
since grown to be a mainstay in the prescription drug landscape, as
American healthcare consumers have increasingly relied on their safety
and effectiveness.3
A published national compendium called the “Orange Book,” formally
known as the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations,4 plays a pivotal role, within the context of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, in determining generic drug entry into the marketplace. The Orange
Book is a publication by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of
all FDA-approved drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FD&C Act) and the drugs’ respective information, including a drug’s
therapeutic equivalence evaluation, active ingredient, patent information,
and application holder, among other things.5 This publication is heavily
relied upon by: (1) healthcare providers and pharmacies as a reference for
∗
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professor
Alan Bennett, Professor Rady Johnson, and Professor Susan Pocchiari for their insightful and
invaluable feedback in drafting this Note. In addition, I would like to thank my Notes and Comments
Editor, Bret Kupfer, for his thoughtful suggestions. Lastly, many thanks to my colleagues on the
Connecticut Law Review. Without them, this Note would not be possible. All inaccuracies and errors
contained herein are mine alone.
1
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
2
Generic Pharm. Ass’n, Generic Drug Savings in the U.S. Fourth Annual Edition: Savings $1
Trillion Over 10 Years, GPHA 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/
IMSStudy Aug2012WEB.pdf.
3
Id.
4
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL PROCESS, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2014).
5
Id.
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essential safety and efficacy information; and (2) generic prescription drug
companies for information about branded drugs (pioneer drugs or brand
drugs) in determining whether to market a generic version of a branded
drug.7 The submission of inaccurate information to the Orange Book by a
brand-name drug company (innovator drug company or brand company)
could severely impede or preclude the healthcare consumer from having
access to necessary affordable generic drugs. Although the FDA is
responsible for maintaining and publishing the Orange Book pursuant to
the Hatch-Waxman Act,8 the FDA does not critically evaluate the accuracy
of substantive information pertaining to patents and use codes9 provided
by brand-name drug companies.10 The FDA contends that it only holds a
“ministerial role” in this regard.11 This lack of FDA oversight significantly
impacts generic drug companies, the brand-name drug companies, and
ultimately, the healthcare consumer.
Some assert that the Hatch-Waxman Act has not achieved its intended
purpose of balancing the interests of market entry for generics and
supporting continued innovation. From the perspective of brand-name drug
companies, some contend that the Act has benefited generics at the cost of
harming innovation for new or improved drugs. The task of discovering
new medicines is a lengthy, costly, and risky research endeavor by namebrand drug companies. By the time an FDA-approved drug product reaches
the market, ten to fifteen years will have elapsed since the first synthesis of
the new active substance.12 Furthermore, a significant amount of research
is involved before the first synthesis of the new drug candidate is even
achieved. On average, only one to two out of every ten thousand
6
Terry G. Mahn, Is It Time for FDA to Revise Its Orange Book Rules to Deal with Skinny
Labeled Generic Drugs?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., OCT. 12, 2011, at 1, 2.
7
Id.
8
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4 (stating that under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA is
required to make a list of approved drug products publically available along with monthly
supplements).
9
The use code is “a description of any method-of-use patent [that a brand drug company] holds.”
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (e) (2011); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct.
1670, 1676 (2012). The use code is supplied by the brand drug company and is submitted to the FDA
to be published in the Orange Book. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
10
See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (concluding that
the FDA does not have a “duty . . . to review submitted information to determine whether all of the
listed patents claim the drug that is the subject of the NDA”); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d
227, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the FDA serves a “ministerial” role with respect to the Orange
Book); Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The FDA, pursuant
to longstanding practice and its own regulations, and based on its acknowledged lack of expertise and
resources, has refused to become involved in patent listing disputes, accepting at face value the
accuracy of NDA holders’ patent declarations and following their listing instructions.”).
11
aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 243.
12
Int’l Fed’n of Pharm. Mfr. & Ass’ns, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Global Health: Facts
and Figures 2012, IFPMA, 1, 7 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/
content/Publication/2013/IFPMA_-_Facts_And_Figures_2012_LowResSinglePage.pdf.
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compounds synthesized will successfully pass all stages of development
required to become an FDA-approved drug.13 The research required to
bring innovative drugs to market is exceeding difficult and costly. The cost
of developing one drug has been estimated at over $1.3 billion.14
Without innovation from brand-name drug companies, necessary drugs
now available for the betterment of people’s health may not have come to
fruition. Innovation from brand-name drug companies has substantially
improved healthcare. For instance, in the past ten years, well over three
hundred medicines have been approved for hard-to-treat diseases.15
Conditions, such as cardiovascular diseases, which necessitated extensive
treatment in the 1970s, are now more easily managed with oral drugs.16
The annual death rate for cancer patients has been reduced by fifty percent
due to drug advancements.17 In addition to improving the healthcare of
individuals, healthcare costsincluding hospitalization costshave
significantly decreased.18 Specifically, for every dollar spent on innovative
cardiovascular drugs, over three dollars were saved in healthcare costs.19
Brand-name drug companies bear the risk of developing innovative
drugsespecially for unmet medical needswhich ultimately provide a
common good for all.
Brand-name drug companies clearly have a strong interest and need to
recoup their financial research investments.20 Without a financial reward,
there can be no future innovation. With the level of risk and mounting
research costs required to bring innovative drugs to the market coupled
with the concerns of patent life, brand-name companies have strong
incentives to find ways to prolong their ability to maintain market
exclusivity without generic competition.

13

Id.
Id. at 8.
15
Id. at 16.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. (“[F]or every dollar spent on prescription drugs in the United States, more than two dollars
are saved in hospitalization costs”).
19
Id. at 32.
20
See Lawrence Perkins, Pharmaceutical Companies Must Make Decisions Based on Profit, 175
W.J. MED. 422, 422–23 (2001) (“[Pharmaceutical companies] must generate the highest level of
profitability possible to fulfill [their] fiduciary duty of maximizing shareholder value. . . . The revenue
generated from a successful product must recover the cost of not only that product’s research and
development but also the cost of failed ventures.”); Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am., Intellectual
Property Protections Are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry, PHRMA,
http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property (last visited Sept. 1, 2014) (“For every 5,000 to
10,000 experimental compounds considered, typically only one will gain [FDA] approval, after 10 to
15 years of research and development costing an average of $1.2 billion . . . . The few successes must
make up for the many failures . . . [where] only two out of every 10 medicines will recoup the money
spent on their development.).
14
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For healthcare consumers, the government’s most recent National
Health Expenditure Accounts report shows that $2.6 trillion was spent in
the United States on healthcare in 2010, “which translates to $8,402 per
person or about [eighteen] percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic
Product.”21 The National Health Expenditure Accounts report further notes
that healthcare spending is expected to grow by about six percent per year
through 2018, which would overtake the annual growth of the overall
economy by slightly over two percent per year to reach $4.4 trillion by
2018.22 With rapidly escalating healthcare costs, the use of lower-cost
generic prescription drugs plays an essential component in holding down
the growth rate of healthcare spending. Over the past decade, the U.S.
healthcare system amassed about $1.07 trillion in savings due to the
availability of generic drugs, with $192.8 billion saved in 2011.23 For thirty
years, generic prescription drugs have allowed millions of Americans to
obtain the medicine they need at an affordable cost. Efforts and policies
that aid in this national goal should be considered, while unnecessary
impediments, such as inaccurate Orange Book listings, should be
discouraged or eliminated.
This Note examines the lack of FDA review of the Orange Book
within the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act with particular attention paid
to the rationale behind the FDA’s longstanding view of its role. This Note
also focuses on the lack of an efficient and effective procedural mechanism
available for generic companies faced with overly broad use codes. In
addition, cases (and events) that led up to the counterclaim provision as a
remedy for the procedural hole are examined.
Part II describes the Hatch-Waxman Act and provides an overview of
the pathways for generic market entry by means of paragraph I–IV
certifications or a section viii statement. It further explains how the
innovator’s patents may determine whether a generic company must file a
paragraph IV certification or a section viii statement. Part III provides an
explanation of the FDA’s ministerial role with regard to the Orange Book.
Part III further highlights procedural issues that exist for a generic
company that challenges an incorrect Orange Book listing, summarizes
Federal Circuit Court cases that underscore this issue, and introduces the
counterclaim provision as Congress’s solution for this procedural hole. Part
IV focuses on the Supreme Court case Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk,24 in which the counterclaim provision was
employed, and how the Court construed the provision. Part IV also focuses
on issues with the counterclaim provision and highlights Supreme Court
21

Generic Pharm. Ass’n, supra note 2, at 1.
Id.
23
Id.
24
132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
22
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s criticisms of the provision. Lastly, Part V
suggests a need for additional administrative measures, offers some
reasonable and practical suggestions provided by jurists and commentators,
and proposes a possible solution.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A. Purpose
The primary legal embodiment that delineates the relationship between
generic drug companies and innovator brand drug companies is the HatchWaxman Act.25 The Hatch-Waxman Act, which introduced amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, is “often credited with creating
the modern generic drug industry.”26 The policies underpinning this
revolutionary Act were implemented to facilitate the entry of prescription
generic drugs into the market while encouraging brand drug innovation by
introducing complex mechanisms that involve FDA labeling regulations,
FDA drug safety and efficacy regulations, and patent law.27
To balance the facilitation of market entry for generic drugs with the
preservation of brand drug companies’ incentives for continued innovation,
the Act established Title I and II.28 Title I sets forth the procedures under
which the FDA may approve applications for generic versions of pioneer
drugs under the FD&C Act, while Title II restores some of the patent life
lost for new drugs as a result of FDA premarket testing and approval
requirements.29
Prior to its enactment, there were two primary reasons for the lack of
generics available to the public: cost and the length of time required to gain
entry into the market. In 1983, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Generix Drugs30 that generic drugs were considered “new drugs.”31 As a
result, generics were held to the same rigorous efficacy and safety testing
25
Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange
Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 166 (2005).
26
Lisa Barons Pensabene & Dennis Gregory, Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview (2013), available at
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/HatchWaxman%20Act%20Overview%20lpensabene_dgregory.pdf.
27
Derzko, supra note 25, at 166.
28
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984) (stating that under Title I (Abbreviated New
Drug Applications), the “Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 355) is amended” and
that under Title II (Patent Extension), “Title 35 of the United States Code is amended by adding” §
156).
29
Id.; Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the
Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 269, 270–71 (1985) (stating the reasoning underlying Title I and Title II and indicating that
Title II (patent life restoration) may pertain to human biological products and medical devices).
30
460 U.S. 453 (1983).
31
Id. at 461; Flannery & Hutt, supra note 29, at 273.
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standards as new drugs without consideration given to any of the
previously compiled data of the innovator drug, even though many of the
scientific studies for the generic version were merely duplicating results of
the brand drug.33 This standard for genericsessentially a New Drug
Application (NDA) drug approval process34was “prohibitively costly”
and time-consuming; hence, it did not necessarily motivate generic drug
manufacturers to place generic drugs into the stream of commerce.35 The
generation of safety and efficacy data was required for the generic, in part,
because the FDA took the stance that any prior NDA information
generated by a brand company for a new drug was confidential
information.36 Furthermore, in order for a generic company to commence
any clinical studies, it had to wait until the brand company’s patents for a
particular drug of interest expired. Any unlicensed activity of a patent
protected drug by another company could result in infringement
litigation.37
The Hatch-Waxman Act is credited as the primary source for the
infusion of generics into the present day landscape of pharmaceuticals. The
Hatch-Waxman Amendments effectively introduced mechanismsalbeit
complex onesthat revolutionized the prior regime and widened the door
for less-expensive generic prescription drugs to enter the market and be
accessible to millions of healthcare consumers. Before its adoption, no
streamlined FDA approval process existed for generic drugs.38 At the time
of enactment, less than twenty percent of prescribed drugs were generic.39
Today, seventy-five percent of all prescriptions are filled with a generic
drug.40 Although the accessibility of less-costly generics has benefited
healthcare consumers, the Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme has proven to
32
For a new drug to enter the market, the brand manufacturer must receive FDA approval of a
new drug application (NDA). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, before submitting a NDA, the generic
manufacturer had to subject the generic version of the drug to the investigational new drug (IND)
process, which included Phase I, II, and III clinical testing, to demonstrate that the drug was safe and
efficacious for a particular indication. See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 624–
32, 676–77 (3d ed. 2007) (providing a general description of the IND and NDA processes).
33
Derzko, supra note 25, at 167.
34
HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 676–77.
35
Derzko, supra note 25, at 167.
36
Id. The paper NDA process was available and provided a limited exception to the strict NDA
requirements by permitting a generic drug company to rely on the published safety and efficacy data of
an innovator drug. Id. But usually published data was deemed inferior and hence, was insufficient to
warrant NDA approval. Id.
37
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 1, 3.
38
Frederick R. Ball & Elese Hanson, Patent Use Codes, the Orange Book and Section viii
Statements: A Response to Terry Mahn’s Is It Time for FDA to Revise Its Orange Book Rules to Deal
with “Skinny-Labeled” Generic Drugs?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., Dec. 14, 2011, at 1, 2; Pensabene
& Gregory, supra note 26, at 1.
39
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2.
40
Id.
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be a thorn in the side of brand pharmaceutical companies. In the wake of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneer drug companies wereand still
areprogressively concerned with the implications of the Act on their
revenue, which affects their ability to sustain new innovation. The intricate
and complex Hatch-Waxman Act, while attempting to balance the “two
countervailing tasks” of meeting the interests of social welfare concerns in
providing affordable drugs to the public and accommodating the brand
drug companies, is susceptible and vulnerable to “both innovators and
generics [that engage] in strategic behavior . . . to better their own
economic positions.”42
B. Pathways for Generic Market Entry: Paragraph I–IV Certifications
and the Section viii Statement of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme
Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic company may seek
approval from the FDA to market a generic version of a branded drug.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act there are two types of applications for
approval of a generic drug: (1) an Abbreviated New Drug Application43
(ANDA); and (2) a paper NDA.44 For an ANDA, a generic drug company
must demonstrate that the generic version “is effectively a duplicate” of the
Reference Listed Drug (RLD)45the brand drug. Rather than producing
independent scientific safety and efficacy data, the ANDA applicant can
“piggy-back[] [off of] the brand’s NDA.”46 In order for the ANDA to be
accepted, the generic must contain the same active ingredient, route of
administration, dosage form, strength, intended use, and labeling as the
RLD.47 The ANDA applicant must establish that the generic drug in
question is equivalent in bioavailabilitybioequivalentto the RLD.48 A
drug is deemed bioequivalent when it delivers the same concentration of
the active ingredient to the patient’s blood stream, or site of action, over
the same time period as the RLD.49
41

Id.
Derzko, supra note 25, at 167, 168.
43
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
44
Id. § 355(b)(2) (2012); Derzko, supra note 25, at 171–72. Paper NDAs are outside the scope of
this Note and will not be discussed.
45
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2.
46
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012).
47
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2012).
48
21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2014) (defining “bioavailability” as “the rate and extent to which the active
ingredient or active moiety is absorbed from a drug product and becomes available at the site of action”
and “drug product” as “finished dosage form, e.g., tablet, capsule, or solution, that contains the active
drug ingredient, generally, but not necessarily, in association with inactive ingredients”); Caraco, 132
S. Ct. at 1676.
49
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2; see HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 755 (inferring
that bioequivalence is when two drugs have the same bioavailability or “biological availability”).
42
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The Hatch-Waxman Act introduced several mechanisms by which an
ANDA applicant (the generic drug company) may gain entry into the
pharmaceutical market by challenging the innovator drug company’s
patent exclusivity. The ANDA applicant, after consulting the Orange
Book, may make one of the following four certifications:50 (1) paragraph I
certification (there is no appropriate patent listed in the Orange Book); (2)
paragraph II certification (the pertinent listed patent has expired); (3)
paragraph III certification (the appropriate listed patent and other nonpatent market exclusivities are scheduled to expire before the requested
approval);51 or (4) paragraph IV certification (a statutory and artificial
infringement of the brand drug).52 For a paragraph IV certification, the
ANDA applicant must provide a notice letter to the NDA holder53 (the
brand company) within twenty days after the FDA accepts the ANDA.54
The notice letter alerts the brand company that an ANDA has been
submitted to the FDA and provides the basis for the certificationthat the
brand company’s drug patent is not valid or will not be infringed upon.55
The ANDA applicant that submits a paragraph IV certification for the
“purpose of such submission is to obtain approval . . . to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . before the expiration of
[the RLD’s] patent” is committing an act of statutory patent infringement,56
which in turn provides a right for the brand company to sue for
infringement within forty-five days of receiving the certification.57 If the
brand company elects to file an infringement suit, the FDA may not
approve the generic company’s ANDA for thirty months (the “thirtymonth stay”)58 or until a court holds that the listed patent is invalid or not
infringed, whichever is earlier. However, if the NDA holder does not
respond within the forty-five day time frame, the ANDA applicant is
permitted to file a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement and
50

21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv) (2012).
“Non-patent” and “patent-based factors” exclusivity include orphan drug exclusivity (seven
years), new chemical entity exclusivity (five years from the first approval of the NDA, but an ANDA
along with a paragraph IV certification can be filed after four years of the NDA approval, three years
after the first NDA approval), and pediatric exclusivity (tacks on six months of market exclusivity to
any patent exclusivity). Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 2–3.
52
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2012).
53
For large pharmaceutical companies, the patentee and NDA holder are usually the same entity.
However, if the patentee is a different entity from the NDA holder, then the ANDA applicant must also
provide a notice letter to the patentee. Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3.
54
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3) (2012).
55
Id. §§ 355(b)(3), (j)(2)(B) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3.
56
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012); Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 3.
57
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct.
1670, 1677 (2012).
58
35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677. If the RLD has NCE (new
chemical entity) exclusivity, the thirty-month stay commences once the market exclusivity expires.
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 5.
51
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patent invalidity, and the brand company loses its right to a thirty-month
stay.59 The policy underlying the thirty-month stay is intended to provide
the brand drug company certainty that the generic drug company cannot
launch the generic drug during litigation within the thirty-month period.60
To incentivize generic companies to file ANDAs along with paragraph
IV certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 180-day marketing
exclusivity period to the first ANDA applicant who prevails in a paragraph
IV litigation.61 This first paragraph IV filer exclusivity62 precludes final
approval for all other ANDAs asserting paragraph IV certification.63 A
generic company entitled to exclusive marketing rights against all other
generics for 180 days garners a large revenue gain.64 Obtaining this
exclusivity is an underlying motivation for the generic industry.65
The Hatch-Waxman scheme also provides ANDA applicants with
another pathway toward marketing generic drugs through a section viii
statement.66 Unlike a paragraph IV certification, a section viii statement is
not a statutory act of infringement; and hence, not an immediate trigger for
patent infringement litigation.67 Instead, a section viii statement
commonly known in the industry as “skinny labeling”68is a
mechanism used by generic companies to “carve out”69 methods of use for
a particular brand drug. A section viii statement is usually employed when
the brand company’s patent on the composition of matter (the chemical
drug compound itself) has expired and the brand company still holds a
valid, unexpired patent for some FDA-approved treatment with the drug.70
For a section viii statement, the generic company asserts to the FDA that
its generic label does not overlap with the innovator brand company’s
59

21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I)(aa), (j)(5)(C)(i)(I)(aa) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2012).
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 5.
61
21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c) (2012); Derzko, supra note 25, at 174.
62
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 4.
63
However, this “first-filer exclusivity” does not block approval for section viii statements filers.
60

Id.
64
See Jeremiah Helm, Comment, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 175, 180 (2007) (“The
value of this bounty can be considerable . . . .”); Fei Mei Chan, Generic-Drug Firms Compete for
Profits, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.forbes.com/2001/12/12/1212sf.html (stating that with the
180-day exclusivity, “the generic company has a virtual market monopoly”); India’s Ranbaxy Gains;
U.S. Drug Regulator Approves Generic Version of Novartis Drug, REUTERS (June 26, 2014),
http://news.yahoo.com/indias-ranbaxy-gains-u-drug-regulator-approves-generic-035719879--sector.
html (indicating that the generic drug maker, Ranbaxy, may bring in over $200 million in revenue from
its generic version of Novartis AG’s blood pressure drug, Diovan, over the 180-day exclusivity).
65
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2.
66
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2012).
67
Pensabene & Gregory, supra note 26, at 4.
68
Terry G. Mahn, Skinny Labeling and the Inducement of Patent Infringement, UPDATE 39, 39–
40 (2010).
69
Id. at 41.
70
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 (2012).
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71

FDA-approved drug label. In other words, assuming the ANDA meets
other criteria, the generic company wishes to obtain FDA-approval to
manufacture and market the generic drug for an FDA-approved treatment
that is not patent-protected“a carve out” from the brand company’s
approved label.72 Unlike a paragraph IV certification where the generic
company must “bear the same label as the brand-name product,” a generic
company seeking a section viii statement proposes a label that is not
identical and does not overlap with any of the claimed uses.73 Since a
section viii statement does not, in theory, create a statutory infringement on
a brand company’s patent or assert that the patent is invalid, the FDA may
grant immediate approval.74
The FDA will approve an ANDA with a section viii
statement only if (1) there is no overlap between the
proposed label submitted by the ANDA applicant and the use
described in the Orange Book, and (2) removing the
information about the claimed method of use from the label
does not render the drug less safe or effective.75
C. The Innovator’s Patents Determine a Paragraph IV Certification or a
Section viii Statement
The type of patent held by the brand drug company determines
whether the ANDA applicant (a generic company) should assert a
certification (paragraph I–IV) or section viii statement.76 Essentially, there
are two types of patents pertaining to brand-name drugs: a composition of
matter patent (claiming the drug compound itself) and a method of use
patent (claiming a particular method of using the drug).77 Oftentimes, a
brand drug company may be the owner of both types of patents for a drug
where the drug compound expires before the method of use patent.78 Once
the drug compound patent has expired, the FDA-approved methods of use
that are not patent protected can be vulnerable to generics seeking a section
viii statement.79 The presence of a valid composition of matter patent
71

Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677; 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2012).
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677.
73
Id.
74
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2.
75
Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
76
See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (“[T]he FDA cannot authorize a generic drug that would
infringe a patent . . . [which] depends on the scope and duration of the patents”).
77
Id.; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/
testimony/ucm115218.htm (last updated July 24, 2009).
78
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
79
See id. at 1677 (“A section viii statement is typically used when the brand’s patent on the drug
compound has expired and the brand holds patents on only some approved methods of using the drug.
72
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effectively precludes a section viii statement because any use of the drug
itself, even for a method of use not patented by the drug company, is an
infringement.80 Alternatively, an ANDA applicant may assert a paragraph
IV certification when a patent exists for the drug compound itself or for a
method of use for that drug.81
III. THE ROAD TO THE COUNTERCLAIM PROVISION
A. The Orange Book’s Role within the Hatch-Waxman Act and Listing
Practices
In accordance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA must maintain
and publish a list of patents associated with approved drugs.82 This national
compendium is the “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations”commonly known as the Orange Bookwhich
effectively serves two functions: (1) as a reference for healthcare providers
and pharmacies containing essential safety and “effectiveness” information
about brand drugs and their respective generics;83 and (2) as a source of use
codes and patent term information, among other things, for branded
drugs.84 In this respect, the Orange Book is exceedingly important within
the context of paragraph IV certifications and section viii statements.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and FDA regulations, brand drug
companies are required to submit “the patent number and expiration date
of any patent which claims the drug for which the [brand] submitted the
[NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.”85 Once the FDA
approves the NDA, the brand company is to supply a description of all
methods of use patents it holdsknown as the “use code.”86 Prior to 2003,
the NDA applicant was required to include: (1) the patent number and date
If the ANDA applicant follows this route, it will propose labeling for the generic drug that ‘carves out’
from the brand’s approved label the still-patented methods of use. The FDA may approve such a
modified label as an exception to the usual rule that a generic drug must bear the same label as the
brand-name product.”) (citations omitted); Arti Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives – A New
Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 491 (2012) (indicating that when “the
main product patent on a brand-name drug expires before the use patents[,]” generic companies may
file a section viii statement, which provides the generic drug “a potential path to market”).
80
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
81
See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“A generic manufacturer will typically take this [paragraph IV
certification] path in either of two situations: if it wants to market the drug for all uses, rather than
carving out those still allegedly under patent; or if it discovers . . . that any carve-out label it is willing
to adopt cannot avoid the brand’s use code.”).
82
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(2) (2012).
83
See Mahn, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that generics found to be therapeutically equivalent to the
brand drug are given an “A” rating, which results in an accepted substitution for the brand drug).
84
Id.
85
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
86
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.
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of patent expiration; (2) the type of patent (composition of matter or
method of use patent); (3) the patent owner name; and (4) the information
of the entity which is to receive patent certification if the patent owner is
not in the U.S.87 In the 2003 Amendments, the FDA issued supplementary
regulations requiring the NDA holder to supply information for each
method of use patent claiming the approved drug, which includes:
(1) [w]hether the patent claims one or more approved
methods of using the approved drug product and a
description of each approved method of use or indication and
related patent claim of the patent being submitted; (2)
[i]dentification of the specific section of the approved
labeling for the drug product that corresponds to the method
of use claimed by the patent submitted; and (3) [t]he
description of the patented method of use as required for
publication.88
Notwithstanding the detailed requirements necessary for Orange Book use
code listing, the FDA does not substantiate the patent information supplied
by the brand company.89 Because of the lack of FDA oversight, it is
possible that an innovator drug company may list inaccurate use codes90
(including broad use codes),91 which frustrates the purpose of the HatchWaxman Actthe interest in facilitating generic drugs into the market. In
order for a generic company to market a generic version of a brand drug, it
must first consult the Orange Book to determine the type of certification
needed, if any (paragraph I–IV certifications or a section viii statement).92
An inaccurate use code or overly broad use code could preclude, or at least
make it exceedingly more difficult for, a generic version of the drug to
reach the marketplace. In the presence of an overly broad use code, a
generic company wishing to “carve-out” a method of use for a brand drug
is precluded from using a section viii statement to garner a more immediate
FDA approval.93 Instead, the generic company must now file a paragraph
IV certification (statutory infringement) and litigate the validity of the

87

Derzko, supra note 25, at 170.
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 2 (paraphrasing 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(O) (2012)).
89
Id.; Derzko, supra note 25, at 171.
90
See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1330–32 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (exemplifying
an allegation of improper Orange Book listing).
91
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1679, 1687.
92
See id. at 1676 (“After consulting the Orange Book, a company filing an ANDA must assure
the FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe the brand’s patents.”).
93
Id. at 1688 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]f the use code overlaps with the generic
manufacturer’s proposed carve-out label (i.e., if the use code is overly broad), FDA will not approve an
ANDA with a section viii statement.”).
88
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94

brand company’s patent.
Since the FDA is not responsible for the
accuracy of the use codes and does not mandate that the brand company
correct inaccurate use codes, improper listing practices effectively impede
generic market entry. In 1994, the FDA was taken to task concerning its
role with respect to the Orange Book.95 The FDA responded:
[The] FDA does not have the resources or the expertise to
review patent information for its accuracy and relevance to
an NDA. Therefore, the agency declines the comment’s
requests to ensure that patent information is complete and
relevant to an NDA and to confirm, upon request, the validity
of patent information submitted to the agency. The agency
believes that the declaration requirements[,] . . . as well as the
applicant’s potential liability if it submits an untrue statement
of material fact, will help ensure that accurate patent
information is submitted.96
Even in recent years, including after the 2003 Amendments, the FDA
maintains its assertion that “the agency [has] a purely ‘ministerial’ role as
to patent listing issues.”97
B. The FDA’s “Ministerial” Orange Book Role: Court Validation
The courts have validated the FDA’s longstanding view of its
“ministerial” role over the Orange Book. In aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson,98
the Fourth Circuit held that there are no statutory inconsistencies with the
FDA’s view.99 The issue was whether there is an FDA obligation to police
the accuracy of the NDA holder’s Orange Book listing.100 To assess the
FDA’s interpretation of its governing statute, the court employed the twostep framework established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.101 The two-step Chevron framework requires that the
court first determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”102 If congressional intent is clear then that is the “end of
the matter.”103 Second, if the court determines that Congress has not
94
See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that “the generic manufacturer can . . . submit an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification . . . [and] wait for the brand manufacturer to institute suit”
when the generic manufacturer is precluded from a section viii statement).
95
Derzko, supra note 25, at 171.
96
Id. (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct. 3, 1994)).
97
Id. at 214.
98
296 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2002).
99
Id. at 241.
100
Id. at 237.
101
Id. at 237–39 (indicating that the court is employing the two-step framework as stated in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)).
102
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842.
103
Id.
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directly addressed the “question at issue,” or if the statute is equivocal or
silent, then the court must determine whether the “agency’s [own] answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”104 The FDA relied on
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2), which states:
[I]f the holder of an approved [new drug] application could
not file patent information [for a patent claiming a new drug]
because no patent had been issued when an application was
filed or approved, the holder shall file such information . . .
not later than thirty days after the date the patent involved
issued. Upon the submission of patent information under this
subsection, the [FDA] shall publish it.105
The FDA contended that this clearly points to the NDA holder’s
responsibility for filing the necessary information, while the FDA’s role is
“passive.”106
However, aaiPharma (a generic company) asserted that subsections (d)
and (e)107 indicate that the FDA has a responsibility to ensure that eligible
patents are listed in the Orange Book. Subsections (d) and (e) respectively
provide the basis by which the FDA may reject an NDA: (1) if “the
application failed to contain the patent information prescribed by
subsection (b) of this section[,] . . . [the FDA] shall issue an order refusing
to approve the application”;108 and (2) if “the patent information prescribed
by subsection (c) of this section was not filed within thirty days after the
receipt of written notice from the [FDA] specifying the failure to file such
information,” the FDA “shall . . . withdraw approval of an application.”109
The court recognized that in isolation, each provision may be
construed as an unequivocal expression of congressional intent with regard
to the question at issue.110 However, under step one of the Chevron
framework, the provisions taken collectively appeared as though there was
ambiguity with the question at issue.111 Hence, the court proceeded to step
two, where the court ultimately determined that the FDA’s reading of its
role as ministerial was based on a permissible interpretation of section
355.112 aaiPharma effectively condoned the FDA’s longstanding Orange
Book “ministerial” responsibility, which does not include determining the
merits of patent listings.
104

Id. at 843.
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (2012); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2002).
106
aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238.
107
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)–(e) (2012).
108
Id. § 355(d) (2012); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238.
109
21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2012); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238.
110
aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 238.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 238–40.
105
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C. Procedural Issues in Challenging Orange Book Use Codes and the
Lack of FDA Oversight
In the 1990s, indications suggested that innovator drug companies
were strategically taking advantage of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
Orange Book to prevent or delay the entry of generic drugs.113 In 2002, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) produced a study that detailed the
strategicbut anticompetitiveconduct, which included a specific focus
on the practice of brand companies submitting inaccurate patent
information to the FDA and the lack of Orange Book listing review.114
Furthermore, as early as 2002, the FTC had formally recognized issues
regarding Orange Book listing practices and issued a citizen’s petition to
the Commissioner of the FDA regarding the “listability” of patents in the
Orange Book.115 In seeking guidance for Orange Book listing criteria, the
FTC underscored the issue that “generic competition can be delayed on
name-brand drug products if the name-brand companies newly list
‘irrelevant and undefendable’ patents in the Orange Book near the
expiration of the name-brand drug product’s original patents.”116 As of
2002, there was no substantive recourse for a generic company to
challenge the accuracy of an inaccurate Orange Book listing.117 By
regulation, the limited measure available was to notify the FDA in writing,
and in turn, the FDA would only request that the brand drug company
confirm the accuracy of the listed information.118 Since the FDA views its
responsibility in maintaining the Orange Book as “purely ministerial,” it
“[does] not change the patent information in the list,” except when “the
[NDA] holder withdraws or amends its patent information in response to
the FDA’s request.”119 In other words, the FDA does not mandate any
corrections or delisting of the brand name company’s use code and patent
listings.120 Because the “Orange Book listing elevates every patent as a
potential source of delay to generic competition,” the “Orange Book can be
a strategic weapon.”121
113

Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012).
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY i–iv, 39–40, 42–
45, 48 (July 2002), [hereinafter FTC STUDY] available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf
(focusing on strategic conduct by the brand pharmaceutical companies submitting inaccurate patent
listings and taking advantage of the multiple thirty-month stays).
115
Id. at 54–56.
116
Id. at A-25.
117
Id. at iv, 44–45.
118
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2012); FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44.
119
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2012).
120
FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44.
121
See Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3 (indicating that the Orange Book was a “strategic
weapon” in pre-2003 Amendments).
114
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D. Federal Circuit Cases: An Impetus
Several generic companies have brought the issue of inaccurate Orange
Book listings to the courts. Several Federal Circuit cases collectively serve
as part of a significant force for congressional action.122
1. Mylan v. Thompson: No Private Right of Action for Orange Book
Correction
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,123 the Federal Circuit
held that generic companiesANDA applicantsdo not have a private
right of action to challenge the NDA holder’s Orange Book listing as
improper and to delist the patent.124 The court asserted that Mylan’s action
essentially a right of action for delistingwas not a proper or
“recognized” patent infringement defense under patent law, but a private
right of action.125 In addition, the court stated that it is impermissible for a
private party to enforce the FD&C Act.126
There, Mylan sued Bristol-Myers Squibb seeking an order requiring
Bristol-Myers Squibb to delist its patent from the Orange Book.127 In
anticipation of the Bristol-Myers Squibb patent expiration for its drug
BuSpar® (buspirone hydrochloride), Mylan acquired tentative approval of
its ANDA application under a paragraph III certification (certification
whereby the generic waits for the appropriate patent to expire before it is
fully authorized for generic entry into the market).128 However, shortly
before the buspirone patent expired,129 Bristol-Myers Squibb produced
patents claiming the metabolite of the drug to the FDA,130 which
122
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012) (stating that Mylan
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson was responsible, in part, for congressional action); Derzko, supra note 25,
at 181 (indicating that both Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson and Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.
were cases that resulted in congressional action).
123
268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
124
Id. at 1332–33.
125
Id. at 1332 (“Mylan’s arguments further bolster our conclusion that its claim is not a recognized
defense to patent infringement. . . . Therefore, we are forced to conclude that Mylan’s action here
against [BMS] is in essence an attempt to assert a private right of action for ‘delisting’ under the
[FD&C Act].”).
126
See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain
violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.”); Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268
F.3d at 1330 (“It is well settled . . . that the FDCA creates no private right of action.” (quoting In re:
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1999))). Recognized defenses
against patent infringement include only statutory defenses (which include non-infringement,
unenforceability, and invalidity in the context of patentability) and inequitable conduct defense (which
include unclean hands, fraud, and misuse). Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268 F.3d at 1331.
127
Mylan Pharms., Inc., 268 F.3d at 1325.
128
Id. at 1327.
129
Id. at 1327–28 (indicating that BMS produced patents just eleven hours before the expiration
of the original drug patent).
130
Id. at 1328.
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“ostensibly extend[ed] its rights over the drug, but in fact cover[ed] neither
the compound nor any method of using [the compound].”131
As a result of Mylan, the FTC correctly noted that the sole option for a
generic company is to file a paragraph IV certification, which creates a
statutory infringement and subjects the ANDA to a thirty-month stay
before it can be approved.132 Hence, the lack of express statutory
provisions enabling an action to challenge a brand company’s Orange
Book listing impedes the underpinning of the Hatch-Waxman Actto
facilitate the entry of generics into the market.
2.

Andrx v. Biovail & aaiPharma v. Thompson: No Remedy for
Generics Under the Administrative Procedure Act

In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,133 the Federal Circuit
concluded that although there is not a private right of action for delisting as
established in Mylan, a generic company has the option to bring a claim
against the FDA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).134
Improper Orange Book listing conduct by the brand company (Biovail)
was of controversy in Andrx.135 In 2001, Andrx (a generic company)
prevailed in a non-infringement paragraph IV certification suit against
Biovail concerning U.S. Patent No. 5,529,791 (patent ’791) for the active
ingredient, diltiazem hydrochloride.136 As a result, the FDA was ready to
approve Andrx’s ANDA; however, in the following month, Biovail listed
an extended time-release formulation of diltiazem hydrochloride claimed
in U.S. Patent No. 6,162,463 (patent ’463).137 In view of Biovail’s new
listing, the FDA could no longer approve Andrx’s ANDA application.138
Andrx contended that listed patent ’463 did not properly claim diltiazem
hydrochloride and requested that the FDA delist patent ’463 from the
Orange Book.139 Biovail affirmed that patent ’463 claims diltiazem
hydrochloride, the drug itself, as supplied in the original NDA.140 In
131
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012) (referring to the
brand company’s Orange Book listing practice in Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson).
132
Id. (referring to the FTC STUDY indicating that this was the only recourse for generics in this
predicament).
133
276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
134
Id. at 1378–80.
135
Id. at 1377 (indicating that an incorrect patent listing, which did not claim the drug approved in
the brand company’s original NDA, does not “permit [the brand company] Biovail to benefit from
additional thirty-month stay”). Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. also significantly dealt with the
brand company’s effort to garner multiple thirty-month stays, which is currently not available under the
2003 Amendments. Id. at 1374, 1377. The issue of multiple thirty-month stays is outside the scope of
this Note.
136
Id. at 1372.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1373.
140
Id.
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addressing Andrx’s request for relief in court,
the Federal Circuit
concluded that although there is not a private right of action for delisting
an Orange Book listing as established in Mylan, a generic company may
bring a claim against the FDA under the Administrative Procedure Act to
compel the FDA to approve the ANDA.142
Federal Circuit Judge Alan Lourie criticized the Federal Circuit’s
suggestion.143 In a dissenting opinion in another case, Judge Lourie
asserted that when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the FDA did not
anticipate having substantive issues of patent listing and that “[r]equiring
patent listings to be addressed only by APA actions involving the FDA
amounts in practical terms to a distortion of the provisions of the Food and
Drug Act relating to patent listings and challenges.”144 Essentially, the
Federal Circuit in Andrx put the FDA in the untenable position of having to
address inaccurate patent listings in the Orange Book when the FDA has
continuously expressed a lack of expertise and resources to review patent
listings.145
Recently, Federal Circuit Court Judge Timothy Dyk asserted that
despite Andrx, prevailing in an APA challenge might not be likely.146 In
order to prevail, the generic company must be able to demonstrate that the
FDA’s refusal to police the Orange Book use codes conflicts with a statute
or was “arbitrary and capricious.”147
The Federal Court’s proposition for relief under an APA challenge was
tested in the Fourth Circuit. In aaiPharma v. Thompson, a generic
company (aaiPharma) brought a lawsuit under APA for the FDA to require
the NDA holder (Eli Lilly) to submit a patent for listing in the Orange

141

Id.
Id. at 1378–80; FTC STUDY, supra note 114, at 44.
143
See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 295 F.3d 1274, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Lourie, J., dissenting) (“Requiring patent listings to be addressed . . . by APA actions involving the
FDA amounts in practical terms to a distortion of the provisions of the Food and Drug Act relating to
patent listing and challenges.”).
144
Id. at 1275 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
145
Derzko, supra note 25, at 181.
146
See Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Dyk, J., dissenting) (“Nor would there be a remedy in a suit under the [APA]. To be sure, we have
held that an APA action could be brought to challenge FDA action in refusing to police use codes in the
Orange Book, but at the same time we expressed no view as to whether such an action would succeed.
To succeed in such an action, the ANDA applicant would have to establish that the FDA’s refusal to
police codes was arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to the statute. We have subsequently held that the
FDA is under no statutory obligation to determine the correctness of particular patent listings in the
Orange Book, and that nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act requires the FDA to screen Orange Book
submissions . . . and refuse those that do not satisfy the statutory requirements for listing.”) (citations
omitted).
147
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d
at 1381–82 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
142
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148

Book.
aaiPharma asserted that the FDA’s refusal to “police the
correctness of Orange Book listings [was] arbitrary and capricious”
because the FDA had delegated its administrative duties to private parties
(NDA holders).149 The Fourth Circuit confirmed that the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard is narrow as established by the Supreme Court.150 In
determining whether an agency’s act is “arbitrary and capricious,” the
court must determine whether “the agency . . . examine[d] the relevant data
and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”151 An
agency’s rule may be deemed “arbitrary and capricious” if: (1) “the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”; (2)
the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”;
(3) the agency has “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency”; or (4) the rule “is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or product of agency
expertise.”152 Under this standard of review, the Fourth Circuit determined
that, with respect to the Orange Book, the FDA was not arbitrary and
capricious.153 First, the court asserted that the FDA’s “ministerial” role
rested on a permissible construction of the Hatch-Waxman Act.154 The
primary reason for this “ministerial” role is that the paragraph IV
certification scheme was to have private parties’ intellectual property rights
settled via patent infringement suits, while the FDA was to focus on the
effectiveness and safety of the drugs.155 Consequently, it seems unlikely
that Congress’s intent was to have the FDA take on this responsibility of
reviewing the merits of Orange Book listings.156 Second, the court stated
that “[w]hen an agency has discretion about whether to take on
enforcement responsibilities, an explanation that it lacks the resources and
148

aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 233–34 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 241.
150
See id. at 242 (indicating that the Supreme Court had established that the standard of review
was set forth in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
151
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
152
Id. at 43.
153
aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 242–43.
154
Id. at 242. Several courts have affirmed the policy that the FDA serves a “ministerial” role
with respect to the Orange Book. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347–49, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the FDA to review patents substantively
before listing in the Orange Book.”); aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 242–43 (“[T]he FDA may persist in
its purely ministerial approach to the Orange Book listing process.”); Am. Bioscience, Inc. v.
Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he FDA has a longstanding policy not to get
involved with patent disputes. It administers the Hatch-Waxman Amendments in a ministerial fashion
simply following the intent of the parties that list patents.”).
155
aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 241.
156
Id.
149
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the expertise to do so is enough to satisfy the requirement of reasoned
agency decision making.”157 Lastly, the FDA has never wavered in its
position that it lacks the necessary resources and expertise to make patent
law judgments.158
It was apparent from case law that the Hatch-Waxman Act was not
equipped to handle Orange Book listing issues and “was ripe for reform in
this respect.”159 To further support this contention, Federal Circuit Judge
Sheldon Plager asserted a need for reform:
The need for the FDA to properly police the administration
of the Act in this regard was made even more acute by our
decision in Mylan . . . . If neither the Administration nor the
courts see fit to make clear FDA’s obligation to administer
the act in a responsible way, Congress should consider doing
so.160
Clearly, there was a significant need for reform of Orange Book listing
practices within the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act as evidenced by the
FTC Study, the courts and case law, and the frustration suffered by generic
companies. Brand drug companies are “playing a new game: by
inaccurately describing the scope of their method of use patents to [the]
FDA, they are limiting the immediate approval pathway provided by
section viii.”161
E. The Counterclaim Provision: Congress’s Answer to Inaccurate and
Overly Broad Orange Book Listings
To address the manipulative Orange Book listing practices,162
Congress created a legal counterclaim provision to a paragraph IV
infringement lawsuit163 under the auspices of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.164 The new provision
permits generic ANDA applicants sued for patent infringement to:
assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand
157

Id. at 242.
Id. at 242–43.
159
Derzko, supra note 25, at 184.
160
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring).
161
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3.
162
Based on the legislative history leading up to the counterclaim provision, it was well-known in
Congress that brand drug companies were manipulating the Orange Book in the context of the HatchWaxman Act to further stave off generic entry. See Derzko, supra note 25, at 224–26 (“What we saw,
regrettably under Hatch-Waxman, was [that] there were games being played . . . . This bill is an
attempt to address those issues.” (quoting 149 CONG. REC. S8193 (daily ed. June 19, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Gregg)).
163
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
164
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2456. .
158
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drug manufacturer] to correct or delete the patent information
submitted by the [brand drug manufacturer] . . . on the
ground that the patent does not claim either(aa) the drug
for which the [brand drug manufacturer’s NDA] was
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.165
In other words, this counterclaim provision enables a generic ANDA
applicant to pursue a judgment that would compel a brand drug company
to amend or delist patent information that precludes the FDA’s approval of
the generic ANDA.166
The counterclaim provision was recognized as a “patch” on the
“procedural hole” that manifested in Mylan and Andrx.167 By establishing
the counterclaim provision, legislators have recognized and addressed the
issue and have tacitly rejected the idea of an administrative delisting
mechanism. Although the counterclaim provision does provide a
mechanism for delisting, generics view the procedural path as cumbersome
and costly because the counterclaim is only used when engaged in a
paragraph IV infringement action.168 Generic companies would have
preferred an administrative review mechanism.169 Yet some scholars have
recognized that such an administrative mechanism would be very
unlikely.170
IV. THE COUNTERCLAIM PROVISION AT WORK
A. Caraco v. Novo Nordisk: Construing the Counterclaim Provision
Caraco v. Novo Nordisk171 illuminates an underlying defect in the
counterclaim provision.172 This Supreme Court case underscores the view
165

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012).
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012).
167
Derzko, supra note 25, at 242.
168
See Alan Bennett et al., Supreme Court Rules on Patent Use Codes, ROPES & GRAY (Apr. 19,
2012), http://www.ropesgray.com/zh/news-and-insights/Insights/2012/04/supreme-court-rules-on-pate
nt-use-codes.aspx (“Justice Sotomayor highlighted the fact that the availability of a counterclaim does
not solve the problem inherent in the statute: because there is no validation of use codes submitted to
FDA by brand manufacturers, costly and time-consuming litigation is necessary to correct overly broad
use codes.”); Dianna Goldenson El Hioum, Caraco Pharamceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S: Generics May Seek Correction of Overly Broad Use Codes, MERCHANT & GOULD (May 1, 2012),
http://www.merchantgould.com/Resource_WP_2012_05_CaracoPharm.aspx (“Justice Sotomayor . . .
points out that excess litigation might be avoided if the FDA clarifies its ‘remarkably opaque’ use code
requirements so generics would not have to resort to the counterclaim provision to clear a path to
market entry for non-infringing drugs. Until that happens or Congress amends Hatch-Waxman, . . . a
cumbersome path to section viii approval is likely to continue.”).
169
Derzko, supra note 25, at 242.
170
Id.
171
132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
172
Id. at 1678.
166
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that NDA holders have manipulated the scheme by supplying inaccurate or
overly broad use codes to preclude or stave generics from the market,
especially in the context of section viii statements.173
Caraco, a generic company, sought to manufacture and market
repaglinide, a diabetes drug. Novo Nordisk, a brand drug company,
manufactures the brand-name version of repaglinidemarketed as
Prandin®which has been approved by the FDA for three uses in the
treatment of diabetes: (1) repaglinide, the drug itself; (2) repaglinide in
combination with metformin; and (3) repaglinide in combination with
thiazolidinediones (TZDs).174 Novo Nordisk, the original NDA holder,
owned patent U.S No. RE 37,035 (patent ’035) for the compound itself,
which was set to expire in 2009.175 In 2004, Novo Nordisk was granted a
method of use patentU.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 (patent ’358)which
“claims a ‘method for treating [diabetes by] administering . . . repaglinide
in combination with metformin.’”176 Patent ’358 was not set to expire until
2018.177 However, Novo Nordisk did not hold a method of use patent for
repaglinide in combination with TZDs.178 With this information in 2005,
Caraco indicated to the FDA that it would wait until after patent ’035 (the
composition of matter patent for repaglinide)179 expired in 2009 to market
the generic version, but duly filed its ANDA along with a paragraph IV
certification for patent ’358 (repaglinide in combination with
metformin).180
Because Novo Nordisk’s use code was only for patent ’358 (the “[u]se
of repaglinide in combination with metformin to lower blood glucose”),
the FDA advised Caraco that it could file a section viii statement, a “carveout,” for the other two uses not patent protected but FDA-approvedthe
use for the treatment of diabetes with repaglinide itself and the use for the
treatment of diabetes with repaglinide in combination with TZDs.181 This
would permit Caraco to enter its generic version into the market without an
infringement suit by Novo Nordisk.182 Before the FDA could approve
Caraco’s ANDA, Novo Nordisk amended its use code to read a “method
173

Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3–4.
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678.
175
Id.; Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
176
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1678. (quoting a claim in U.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 as stated in Novo
Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1678–79.
179
Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1362.
180
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1679.
181
Id. (quoting the Orange Book use code as stated in Novo Nordisk v. Caraco, 601 F.3d at 1362–
63).
182
Caraco would be able to market their generic immediately for the two uses, provided that the
ANDA was “otherwise in order” with regard to bioequivalence, etc. Id.
174
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for improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes[,]” which
encompassed all three FDA-approved methods. As a result of this overly
broad use code, the FDA could no longer accept Caraco’s carve-out label;
Caraco was effectively blocked from its ANDA and could not bring its
generic version to market under a section viii statement.184
Caraco reacted to Novo Nordisk’s newly broad use code by employing
the statutory counterclaim provision in the on-going paragraph IV
infringement suit, which it had initiated in 2005.185 The counterclaim was
used to mandate Novo Nordisk to correct the use code to accurately reflect
only the method of use for which there was patent protection.186 But the
first issue at hand for the court was to determine the meaning and scope of
the counterclaim provision.187
Construction of the counterclaim provision hinged on the meaning of
the words “not . . . an” in the provision stating that the generic company
that “sued for patent infringement may bring a counterclaim” based “on the
ground that the patent does not claim . . . an approved method for using the
drug.”188 The Federal Circuit construed “not . . . an approved method” to
mean “not . . . any approved methods.”189 Hence, based on the Federal
Circuit’s construction, the “Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes a counterclaim
only if the listed patent does not claim any approved methods of using the
listed drug.”190 The Federal Circuit effectively found that since Novo
Nordisk had a valid patent for one FDA-approved method of use
(repaglinide in combination with metformin), it would preclude Caraco
from using the statutory counterclaim provision.191 However, the Supreme
Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit and found that the “text and
context demonstrate that the counterclaim is available not only (as in
183

Id. (quoting the amended use code as stated in Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1363).
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1681–83.
188
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2012) (emphasis added); Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1680–81.
189
Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
190
Id. at 1365 (emphasis added).
191
Id. at 1380 (Dyk, J., dissenting). The Federal Circuit held that Congress intended the provision
to allow courts to order a correction of patent numbers and expiration dates listed in the Orange Book
but not to use code language. Id. at 1366. However, Federal Circuit Judge Dyk dissented from this
construction and interpreted the provision in the context of the underlying basis for the counterclaim
provision. Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“In 2003, Congress enacted the counterclaim provision of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to prevent manipulative practices by patent holders with respect to the
Orange Book listings. These practices were designed to delay the onset of competition from generic
drug manufacturers.”). He construed the provision to be used by an ANDA applicant “to assert the
counterclaim to correct or delete the Orange Book ‘patent information submitted . . . under subsection
(b) or (c)’ on the ground that the patent does not claim ‘the drug for which the application was
approved’ or ‘an approved method of using the drug.’” Id. at 1370 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)
(2012)).
184
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Mylan) when the patent listing is baseless, but also (as here) when it is
overbroad.”192 The Supreme Court’s statutory construction interpreted
“not . . . an” within the context of the statute.193 Also, by construing the
statutory provision within the context of the overall purpose of the HatchWaxman framework and its underlying goal, the Supreme Court stated that
the counterclaim naturally functions to challenge the brand’s
assertion of rights over whichever discrete use (or uses) the
generic company wishes to pursue. That assertion, after all, is
the thing blocking the generic’s entry on the market. The
availability of the counterclaim thus matches the availability
of FDA approval under the statute: A company may bring a
counterclaim to show that a method of use is unpatented
because establishing that fact allows the FDA to authorize a
generic drug via section viii.194
Novo Nordisk asserted that the underlying basis for the counterclaim
provision was to aid generic companies that found themselves in the same
predicament as in Mylanwhen the brand company’s use codes were
baseless.195 However, the Supreme Court contended “Mylan alerted
Congress to a broader problemthat generic companies generally had no
avenue to challenge the accuracy of brands’ patent listings.”196
B. Counterclaim Provision Defects
1. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurring Opinion: Not a “Fix” for Overly
Broad Orange Book Listings
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Caraco, severe
inefficiencies in employing the counterclaim provision exist.197 Although
Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with the Court’s holding and analysis, she
thoughtfully stated that the counterclaim provision “can only lessen the
difficulties created by an overly broad use code; it cannot fix them.”198
Because a section viii statement is not an act of infringement, the
192

Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1687.
Id. at 1681 (giving examples of when “not an” is interpreted as “not any” and when it does not
mean “not any” within different contexts and concluding that “[t]he meaning of the phrase turns on its
context”). In addition, the Supreme Court also acknowledges that Congress did not intend “not an” to
mean “not any” because Congress employed “not any” in an immediate, subsequent subclause which
indicates to the Court that Congress “knew how to say ‘not any’ when it meant ‘not any.’” Id. at 1682.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1686, 1687.
196
Id. at 1687.
197
See id. at 1688–89 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the problems associated with the
process and asserting that “the counterclaim cannot restore the smooth working of a statutory scheme
thrown off kilter by an overly broad use code”).
198
Id. at 1688.
193
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counterclaim provision is not available for generics proposing a “carveout” label. As a result, a generic company in this predicament, wishing to
employ the counterclaim provision to correct an overly broad Orange Book
listing so that it can effectively file an ANDA application with a section
viii statement must: (1) change its proposed non-infringing “carve-out”
label to the identical brand company’s label and submit a paragraph IV
certification to create a statutory infringement; (2) wait for the innovator
brand company to sue for infringement; and (3) file the counterclaim
provision.199 Finally, if the generic company prevails, then it can file the
section viii statement as originally intended.200
As asserted by Justice Sotomayor, this drawn-out procedure presents
two salient issues: (1) “[the process] results in [a] delay and [an] expense
the statutory scheme [did] not envision”201which effectively undermines
the underpinning of the Hatch-Waxman Act; and (2) the process is not
“guarantee[d]” to work because the counterclaim provision is available
only if the brand manufacturer files a paragraph IV suit.202 Justice
Sotomayor raised concern over the lack of clarity when the brand company
elects not to file suit,203 provided that the generic proceeds with its ANDA
application.204 She asserted that the FDA may still approve the ANDA
application “without prejudice to [the] infringement claims the patent
owner might assert when the ANDA applicant produces or markets the
generic drug.”205 Consequently, the generic company subjects itself to
liability under the patent doctrine of induced infringement206 if the brand
company still holds a patent for some approved method of using the
druga precarious position for the generic drug company.207 To this end,
Justice Sotomayor proclaimed that a “fix is in order, but it must come from
Congress or FDA.”208
2. “Remarkably Opaque” FDA Regulations and Guidance for Orange
Book Listing Practices
In 2003, the FDA issued a “final rule” concerning patent submissions
and listing requirements in the hopes that it would provide clarity and
199

Id.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1689.
203
Id.
204
Alternatively, the generic company may decide not to pursue its ANDA application; hence, a
generic version is precluded from entering the market.
205
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
206
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
207
See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that a generic company
being “forced to proceed[] with a paragraph IV certification” and subject to an induced infringement
claim “is not a position . . . a generic manufacturer wants to be in”).
208
Id.
200

256

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:229

minimize opportunities and attempts for drug companies to “tak[e]
advantage of [the] process,” among other things.209 As set forth by the
“final rule” pertaining to method of use claims,
the [NDA] applicant shall submit information only on those
patents that claim indications or other conditions of use that
are described in the pending or approved application . . . .
For approved applications, the applicant submitting the
method of use patent shall identify with specificity the
section of the approved labeling that corresponds to the
method of use claimed by the patent submitted.210
The language in the new final rule (shown above in italics) replaced “of the
pending or approved application” as stated in the pre-2003 listing rule.
From the FDA’s perspective, this new limiting language clarifies that only
method of use patents pointing to FDA-approved uses are to be listed in
the Orange Book.211 In addition, a declaration form was instituted in an
attempt to simplify patent listing and thwart deceptive listing practices. For
the most part, the declaration form includes a series of “yes” or “no”
questions pertaining to patent information.212 A handful of “yes” or “no”
questions concerning drug substance, drug product, and method of use will
ultimately determine whether the FDA will list the patent in the Orange
Book.213 In addition to the binary questions, the form requires that the
NDA applicant provide a “description of the approved indication or
method of use”the Orange Book “Use Code”in fewer than 240
characters.214 Lastly, the declaration certification warns that “willful and
knowingly false statements” are deemed criminal offenses.215
Notwithstanding the 2003 FDA listing rules, issues remain, as

209
Derzko, supra note 25, at 214. In addition, the final rule applies to only patents listed after
August 18, 2003. Id.
210
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
211
See Derzko, supra note 25, at 216 (suggesting that there is no longer ambiguity about what
type of method of use can be listed in the Orange Book).
212
Form FDA 3542, Patent Information Submitted Upon and After Approval of an NDA or
Supplement, 2 (July 2007) asks “yes” and “no” questions pertaining to patents. For an image of the
Form FDA 3542 (July 2007), see Deborah Herzfeld, Tom Irving & Donna Meuth, Orange Book Use
Codes: Impact of Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, STRAFFORD (June 5, 2012), http://media.straffordpub.com/
products/orange-book-use-codes-impact-of-caraco-v-novo-nordisk-2012-06-05/presentation.pdf. See
also Derzko, supra note 25, at 218 (indicating that such forms with “yes” and “no” questions provide a
“simple algorithm” for FDA personnel to “easily characterize a patent as being listable or not”). The
form is in accordance with section 505(b) and (c) of the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
213
For an image of the FDA Form 3542 (July 2007), see Herzfeld, Irving & Meuth, supra note
212 .
214
Id.
215
Id. (“A willfully and knowingly false statement is a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. 1001.”);
Derzko, supra note 25, at 218.

2014]

INSUFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR ORANGE BOOK CORRECTIONS

257

216

evidenced in Caraco. Although the central issue to the case was the
counterclaim provision, broad Orange Book listing by the innovator drug
company was the cause of this dispute.217 Justice Sotomayor noted that
“[p]recisely because the [Hatch-Waxman] regulatory scheme depends on
the accuracy and precision of use codes,” the “FDA’s guidance as to what
is required of brand manufacturers in use codes [is] remarkably opaque”218
and further illuminates deficiencies in the FDA’s determinative listing
criteria.219 These deficiencies include that 240 characters “may not fully
describe the use as claimed in the patent,” a problem also recognized by
the FDA,220 and the confusion as to whether the method of use or the
indication satisfies the use code.221
V. REFORM SUGGESTIONS
A. The Need for Elevated FDA Oversight
Currently, a generic company’s only recourse, if it takes issue with an
inaccurate or overly broad Orange Book use code listing,222 is to employ
the counterclaim provision in a paragraph IV litigation.223 Many federal
judges and commentators have criticized the lack of FDA oversight and
guidance regarding such a pivotal national compendium.224 Some
216
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (describing some issues in the “FDA’s guidance as to what is required of brand
manufacturers in use codes” and highlighting the inefficiency of counterclaim provision).
217
Id. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]e are here today because of FDA’s opacity in
describing what is required of brand manufacturers.”).
218
Id.
219
Id. at 1689–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that “Novo [Nordisk] understood its . . .
use code to comply with FDA regulations . . . that the regulations permit a brand manufacturer to
submit for publication in the Orange Book a description of either the patented method of use or the
indication (which refers to ‘what a drug does[]’)” and further suggesting that limiting brand
manufacturers to 240 characters in describing the use code may not be sufficient).
220
Id. at 1689.
221
Id. at 1690.
222
The generic party that takes issue with the accuracy of an Orange Book listing can “notify the
FDA.” Then, the FDA will request the innovator drug company to confirm the listing information.
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the FDA cannot supplant
the innovator drug company’s assertion of Orange Book information. Id.; Ball & Hanson, supra note
38, at 4.
223
See Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 4, 10 n.60 (stating that “[in] view of [FDA’s] limited
role, the only remedy for ANDA applicants lies with the courts” and referencing 68 Fed. Reg. at
36,683, which states “[t]he courts have the experience, expertise, and authority to address complex and
important issues of patent law”). This Note has established that the likelihood of prevailing in a
challenge against the FDA under the APA is unlikely.
224
See generally Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Precisely because the
regulatory scheme depends on the accuracy and precision of use codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to
what is required . . . [for] use codes [is] remarkably opaque.”); Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353–54 (Plager, J.,
concurring) (“The need for the FDA to properly police the administration of the Act in this regard was
made even more acute by our decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Thompson . . . .”); Michael
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commentators assert that the lack of FDA oversight “render[s] section viii
null and void,” which effectively forestalls a pathway for generics to enter
the market.225 Furthermore, the FDA’s policy and regulatory regime may
encourage NDA holders to list improper use code descriptions to garner a
thirty-month stay as a result of the generic being required to file paragraph
IV certifications so that it can employ the counterclaim provision.226
Consequently, some have gone so far as to say that the FDA should police
the Orange Book, while others have seemingly sided with the FDA and
have expressed consternation about subjecting the FDA to burdens that it is
not equipped to manage.227 During oral arguments in Caraco, Justice
Kennedy questioned the FDA’s reliance on the Orange Book when the
FDA “doesn’t do anything to ensure the accuracy of the code.”228 The
answer to this profoundyet simplequestion is mired in complex issues
and implications, which this Note has touched upon. Some commentators
have offered meaningful solutions that may yield effects that are in
congruence with the underlying principle for the Hatch-Waxman
Actfacilitating generic entry into the market.
B. Additional Administrative Measures
The FDA has invariably contended that it has only a “ministerial” role
with respect to Orange Book listings based on practical interests229 and a
lack of expressed statutory mandate.230 However, mounting judicial
concerns, as evidenced in Caraco, may cause the FDA to consider taking
some internal measures to alleviate the issue.

Vincent Ruocco, Brand Name or Generic? A Case Note on Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories v.
Novo Nordisk, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 341, 385 (2013) (“[T]he FDA must rise to the
occasion and raise its substantive level of review, police patent codes for accuracy, and proactively
refuse to list overbroad method-of-use patents . . . .”).
225
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 3.
226
Brian J. Malkin & Andrew S. Wasson, Should FDA Undertake More Than a “Ministerial”
Role with Respect to Patent Information?, 1 FOOD & DRUG POL’Y F., Feb. 23, 2011, at 1.
227
See James N. Czaban & Brian H. Pandya, Caraco v. Novo Nordisk – A Divided Supreme
Court, WILEY REIN (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=7648
(stating that Chief Justice Roberts had “expressed concerns” about “greater burdens on the FDA”
because the FDA does not have patent lawyers on staff).
228
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct.
1670 (2012) (No. 10-844) (quoting Justice Kennedy).
229
68 Fed. Reg. 36,683 (June 18, 2003) (“In addition to the absence of any statutory basis for a
substantive agency review of patents, we have long observed that we lack expertise in patent matters. . .
. [O]ur patent listing role remains ministerial.”).
230
Id. at 36,682 (“In the absence of explicit statutory language, we believe an approach that
requires the NDA applicant or holder or patent owner to identify the approved methods of use protected
by the patent is most consistent with the general balance adopted in Hatch-Waxman.”).
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1. Staff Patent Lawyers and Agents
One solution is for the FDA to develop an “internal competency” to
determine the accuracy of patent listings in the Orange Book.231 Many
jurists suggest that the FDA should employ registered U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office attorneys (or patent analysts), especially those who have
pharmaceutical backgrounds,232 to determine the accuracy of such listings.
Judge S. Jay Plager, in his concurring opinion in Apotex v. Thompson,
asserted that
[i]t does not seem to me to be an unreasonable expectation
that the FDA have on its staff a handful of competent patent
analysts, along with its multitude of scientific specialists,
who, at a minimum, could make an initial judgment about the
propriety of a listing, consistent with the statutory
requirement that the NDA holder file required patent
information. . . . This would provide a neutral arbiter between
the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant regarding an
important matter of process, and would provide some balance
between these competing interests, a balance that the HatchWaxman Act was intended to establish in the first place.233
Commentators have indicated that the FDA already practices a similar
exercise in comparing use code descriptions to a proposed generic label
when determining whether a generic company may carve out a brand
manufacturer’s label.234 In addition, the FDA is capable of recognizing
patent claim types (active ingredient, formulations, method of use,
products by process, polymorphs) and can distinguish between some
listable claims and unlistable claims such as intermediate compound and
processing claims.235 This suggests that the FDA already has some patent
knowledge and expertise.236 Furthermore, employing patent attorneys
within the FDA to analyze the finer points for determining listing validity
may be within reason.237
In Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Leavitt,238 a case concerning the FDA’s
Orange Book policy, Judge Stephen Williams contended that even though
231

Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 1.
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring);
Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 1–2., 5.
233
Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353 (Plager, J., concurring).
234
Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 6.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
See id. (“[T]he analysis of determining whether a method-of-use patent claims a use for which
the generic application is submitted requires a more refined skill-set than a patent listing determination
. . . [and] would not be beyond the skills of the competent patent attorneys hired by FDA.”).
238
548 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
232
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the FDA’s ministerial role is an administrative policy choice that is
“consistent with the statute,” the statute does not require a ministerial
role.239 He further concluded that “to read the majority opinion as implying
that the statute locks the FDA into a ministerial role would be
inappropriate” and that “[s]uch a reading would prevent the FDA from
taking a more active role in the listing process.”240 Judge Williams’ view is
consistent with the notion of an internal patent listing review process for
allowable Orange Book listings. The Hatch-Waxman Act does not
expressly or even impliedly bar the FDA from patent review for listing
purposes. As noted, courts have held that the FDA’s longstanding policy of
maintaining a “ministerial” role is reasonable under the FD&C Act;
however, there is no statutory prohibition preventing the FDA from
expanding its responsibilities.241
2. Elevated Oversight for Orange Book Use Code Amendments
It is perhaps onerous for the FDA to completely assume responsibility
for actively scrutinizing all use code submissions by innovator companies.
However, amendments to use codes should rise to the level of elevated
oversight.242 Due to the volume of patents submitted and number of
declarations for a patent, it may arguably be burdensome for the FDA to
police all Orange Book use codes. On average per year, 379 patents are
submitted for Orange Book listing with approximately fourteen percent of
individual patents being named in more than one NDA submission.243 This
results in approximately 432 patents declared on Form FDA 3542,244 which
is used for filing an NDA or supplement. For the FDA to police all
submitted use codes may be considered a daunting and burdensome task at
this time. However, amendments make up a fraction of this volume, which
may result in a reasonably manageable workload.245 It has been suggested
239

Id. at 108 (Williams, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion in Teva, 548 F.3d at 106).
Id. at 110.
241
Malkin & Wasson, supra note 226, at 5 (basing this view on Judge Williams concurring
remarks in Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 48 F.3d at 110).
242
See Julie Dohm, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Patent CarveOut Exception to the Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent Litigation Loophole,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 151, 191–92 (2007) (indicating that generic companies have proposed that brand
manufacturers “disclose relevant patents when amending labels” and further suggesting that “[t]he
FDA can then make a judgment call as to whether the label updates are genuinely for consumer health
or competitive gain”).
243
The annual average number of patents was based on “[t]he numbers of patents submitted to the
FDA for listing in the Orange Book in 2010, 2011, and 2012 were 351, 329, and 458, respectively.” 78
Fed. Reg. 36,194 (June 17, 2013).
244
Id.
245
But see Dohm, supra note 242, at 192 (“[T]he FDA would have to engage in the review of
patents listed or unlisted in the Orange Book. . . . [Its] workload would increase in amount and
difficulty if the FDA had to inquire into the purpose of the amendments and the intent of the NDA
holders.”).
240
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that the brand company’s intention should be considered when amending a
use code“for consumer health or competitive gain”246which would add
unnecessary burdens on the agency. This Note, however, does not advocate
or consider any level of evaluation of the brand company’s motivation for
its use code amendment to the FDA.
In reviewing amendments, the FDA may be able to quickly assess
whether a use code amendment is broadened from its previous version.
This quick assessment may serve as a red flag and indicate whether an
amendment deserves additional scrutiny. For instance in Caraco, if Novo
Nordisk’s use code amendment was subjected to elevated FDA
scrutinyespecially since the use code was clearly broadenedCaraco
might not have been blocked from its initial section viii statement.
The amendment of existing use codes by a brand manufacturer may be
a result of the “remarkably opaque” Orange Book guidelines247 set forth by
the FDA or may be due to a desire to prolong exclusivity in the market by
foreclosing generic entry. For either reason, amendments to use codes
should be subject to enhanced FDA scrutiny and evaluation.
3. Implementation of an Orange Book Listing Challenge Mechanism
Instead of proactive oversight by the FDA, the FDA could consider
implementing a mechanism at the administrative level for generic
companies to “challenge” a use code and correct overly broad use codes.248
Although it has been suggested that this mechanism should be used in
circumstances where a brand manufacturer omits a patent for listing in the
Orange Book,249 this suggestion may be extrapolated to instances where a
generic company suspects an overly broad use code has been listed.
Standards by which an ANDA filer may bring a challenge should be
implemented to weed out unwarranted challenges. For a challenge to be
heard, the ANDA filer must be able to establish a reasonable likelihood of
success or a more likely than not case for the challenge. The challenger
must be able to specifically point to patent claims to demonstrate that a use
code supplied by the brand manufacturer is overly broad.
246
Id. at 191–92 (“The FDA can then make a judgment call as to whether the label updates are
genuinely for consumer health or for competitive gain. . . . [T]he agency’s workload would increase in
amount and difficulty if the FDA had to inquire into the purpose of the amendments and the intent of
the NDA holders.”).
247
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
248
See Dohm, supra note 242, at 194 (“[T]he FDA should set up a mechanism whereby a generic
can challenge the pioneer’s failure to submit to the FDA a patent for inclusion in the Orange Book.”).
249
Id. The practice for brand companies to exclude patents from Orange Book listing is also an
issue for section viii statements. See id. at 193–94 (indicating that patent exclusion from the Orange
Book is a tactic brand companies use to preclude “proposed carve-outs”). Patent exclusion is not within
the scope of this Note.
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Because of the FDA’s unwavering view on its ministerial role,
congressional action may be needed to effect administrative action.250 Even
before Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, judges and commentators have suggested
that Congress should implement statutory provisions that would expressly
grant the FDA additional authority to actively review Orange Book listings
or to provide a mechanism for ANDA filers to challenge Orange Book use
codes.251 In his concurring opinion in Apotex v. Thompson, Judge Plager
opined that the current FDA practice of correcting an Orange Book listing
at the administrative levelwhere the FDA “will not modify the listing
unless the NDA holder agrees” to a modificationis lacking.252 He
contends that the FDA “could make an initial judgment about the propriety
of a listing, consistent with the statutory requirement that the NDA holder
file required patent information”253 and could serve as a “neutral arbiter
between the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant . . . and would provide
some balance between these competing interests, a balance that the HatchWaxman Act was intended to establish in the first place.”254 This notion is
still viable since the counterclaim provision may only be employed upon
an infringement suit.255
4. Generic Drug User Fee Act: Funds to Support Substantive Orange
Book Review
Historically, the FDA has maintained that it does not have the
resources to provide services beyond a ministerial role. Instituting generic
filing fees may provide a means for the FDA to fund additional patent
attorneys. Until October 2013, the FDA did not charge fees for processing
ANDAs. Many commentators in the field have long asserted that
instituting an ANDA filing fee would yield the necessary revenue for the
FDA to support patent law expertise and other resources to properly review
250
See Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1689 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“A fix is in order, but it must
come from Congress or FDA.”).
251
See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Plager, J., concurring)
(“If neither the Administration nor the courts see fit to make clear FDA’s obligation to administer the
Act in a responsible way, Congress should consider doing so.”); Derzko, supra note 25, at 242
(asserting that Judge Plager “would agree that some kind of administrative mechanism beyond just
allowing for a patent infringement counterclaim is in order”); see also Christopher R. Walker, Deadly
Delay / Postponed Pills, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 271–72 (2010) (“[R]eforms may
take the shape of a new statutory provision to challenge Orange Book listings . . . . The remedy to
prevent such occurrences in the future is clear statutory language that grants the FDA additional
power.”).
252
Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1353 (Plager, J., concurring).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Judge Plager also indicates that he was “not impressed with the argument that the problem is
cured because ultimately the validity of any listed patent will be determined by a court” and that “[t]he
ultimate judicial vindication, . . . comes much later, and at considerable additional cost.” Id.
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256

Orange Booking listings.
In July 2012, the FDA implemented the
Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA),257 building on the success
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).258 PDUFA currently
funds approximately half of new drug review efforts. This increased
funding has effectively terminated the “slow and unpredictable review and
approval” process for NDAs while maintaining the high standards
required.259 PDUFA funds provide the FDA with the ability to hire
additional staff to expedite the NDA review process. For instance, the FDA
nearly doubled the number of full-time drug review staff members from
1,277 in 1992 to 2,503 in 2004.260 Substantively, the FDA was able to
generally improve drug development by providing the brand drug
companies guidance for reducing unnecessary drug trials and improving
application submissions. Furthermore, with the added resources, the FDA
strengthened its review process and standards, making it “more rigorous,
consistent, and predictable.”261 Collectively, these improvements resulted
in decreased development costs and lessened review periods.262 In effect,
these desirable developments allowed the FDA to provide the public with
more efficient access to new drugs.
Similar to PDUFA, GDUFA’s underlying policy rationale is “to speed
access to safe and effective drugs to the public and reduce costs to
industry.”263 GDUFA requires that ANDA applicants now pay a fee for the
review of their application and for the inspection of generic drug facilities.
Hence, GDUFA funds will enable the FDA to address the backlog of
256

Ruocco, supra note 224, at 383–84.
21 U.S.C. § 379j-42(a)(4) (2012); FDA, GENERIC DRUG USER FEE AMENDMENTS OF 2012
(2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/default.htm
(indicating that GDUFA includes ANDA, Drug Master Fees File fees (DMF), Prior Approval
Supplement (PAS), Backlog, and Facility fees) (last updated Aug. 6, 2014).
258
21 U.S.C. §§ 379j(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (2012); FDA, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT,
http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee/default.htm. The FDA, pursuant to its
administrative policy to promote supplementary funds without raising new taxes, proposed to institute
user fees for NDAs, for instance $126,200 for a full NDA. HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 678–81. This
was met with resistance from pharmaceutical companies and Congress. Id. at 678–79. The
pharmaceutical industry feared that these fees were planned to replacenot add toappropriated
funds. Id. By 1992, the NDA approval time “reached a high of three years.” Id. at 679. As a result, the
pharmaceutical industry’s opposition toward user fees waned, and the industry agreed to support fees.
Id. The pharmaceutical industry and the FDA reached an agreement that user fees would supplement,
not replace “existing FDA baseline appropriations.” Id. PDUFA was enacted in 1992 with the
underlying reason to provide the FDA with additional funds to support the NDA process in order
improve FDAs efficiency while maintaining high standards. Id. at 679–81.
259
HUTT ET AL., supra note 32, at 680.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. (indicating that the NDA applications median approval time reduced from 13.2 months
before the PDUFA in 1993 to 6.4 months in 2003).
263
GDUFA Legislation and Background, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees
/GenericDrugUserFees/ucm337385.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2014).
257
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pending applications, reduce the median time for ANDA review, and
promote inspections.264
With this newly enacted fee collection regime, the FDA may also be
able to fund efforts toward actively reviewing the Orange Book beyond its
current ministerial role by hiring patent attorneys to delineate patent claims
and use codes. In 2013, GDUFA was anticipated to garner $299 million265
in funding for the FDA, in part, by charging $51,520 for each original
ANDA application.266 Since the approval process for an ANDA application
is significantly less complex and time consuming, the GDUFA ANDA fee
pales in comparison to a PDUFA NDA fee of $1,958,800 in 2013.267 The
current $51,520 rate for an ANDA review is rather nominal; hence, the
FDA may be able to reasonably increase the rate to cover the costs
necessary to substantively review Orange Book listings.268
5. Change in Listing Requirements: Use Codes Should Be Identical to
the Patent Claim
As suggested by some practitioners, an alternative that the FDA may
resort to without significantly increasing the burden upon itself is to
require use codes to be identical in language to the patent’s claims.269 Not
allowing the brand company to “free-hand” its use code language would
eliminate any listing manipulation.270 Furthermore, it would extinguish any
guesswork and additional verification needed by the FDA in determining
whether a use code is duly listed. Proponents of this practice assert that this
alternative may significantly prevent “variability” or “abuse” without
incurring costs or overburdening the FDA.271 This proposed practice may
not require the FDA to provide additional patent law staff to construe the
use code against the patent claim.
264
Alexander Gaffney, FDA Tries to Clear ANDA Backlog Before User Fee Assessment,
REGULATORY FOCUS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-articleview/article/2142/fda-tries-to-clear-anda-backlog-before-user-fee-assessment.aspx (assuming that there
are approximately 2,500 ANDAs backlogged); Kurt R. Karst, Our GDUFA Cup Runneth Over! FDA
Sets Several 2013 User Fee Rates, FDA L. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_
law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/10/our-gdufa-cup-runneth-over-fda-sets-several-fy-2013-user-feerates.html (indicating that are well over 2,000 ANDAs backlogged as of 2012).
265
Karst, supra note 264.
266
2013 Frequently Asked Questions: Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) and Prior
Approval Supplement (PAS) Fees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/generic
druguserfees/ucm363561.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013).
267
77 Fed. Reg. 45,639, 45,642, 45,643 (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/ FR-2012-08-01/pdf/2012-18711.pdf.
268
The FDA has listed its anticipated ANDA fee of $58,730 for 2015. Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) and Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) Fees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
ForIndustry/UserFees/GenericDrugUserFees/ucm319568.htm (last updated July 31, 2014).
269
SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA LAW 549 (2011).
270
Id. at 549; Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 5.
271
Ball & Hanson, supra note 38, at 5, 7.
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Although, this suggestion attempts to limit the ability for brand
manufacturers to “free-hand” use codes to limit manipulation, a
requirement for use codes to be identical in language to patent claims may
pose some issues. Sometimes method of use patent claims are broader in
scope than that of the FDA-approved use of the drug.272 Patent claims are
oftentimes drafted years in advance of the FDA-approved indication and
method of use. The patentee attempts to anticipate the FDA-approved
method of use of the drug when filing the patent application. Thus, this
practice may result in claims that are broader than the eventual FDAapproved method of use.273 Hence, requiring the brand manufacturer to use
only the claim language as a use code may present the same issue at
handan overly broad use code.
This suggested listing requirement would also impose an additional
burden on the FDA to evaluate and discern whether the FDA-approved use
falls within the patent claims. The suggested listing practice of requiring
only the claim language to be used may not place responsibility on the
NDA filer to ensure that the FDA-approved use is supported by the claims.
Since the FDA-approved use may have language that is different than the
patent claims, it would necessitate further FDA evaluation that involves
expertise that the FDA asserts it does not have. As a result, this listing
requirement suggestion may not succeed in simplifying the current listing
regime.
6. Change in Listing Requirements: Use Codes Should Be Identical to
the FDA-Approved Use
Arguably a more effective change in listing requirements is to require
use codes to be identical to the FDA-approved method of use, provided
that this approved method of use is within the scope of the patent claims. A
use code that is identical to the FDA-approved method not only forecloses
the ability for the NDA applicant to draft “creative” use codes, but it would
only allow the more precise FDA-approved method of use language to be
used rather than the claim language, which tends to be broad in scope. This
proposed listing requirement places the duty on the NDA filer to ensure

272
See Li Feng & Bryan C. Diner, The U.S. Supreme Court “Cracks the Code,” Allowing Generic
Drug Manufacturers Increased Access to the Market Through Skinny Labeling, FINNEGAN (June 2012),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=5144c2c5-a42f-4ecc-b3267545d95d417f (suggesting that brand manufacturers should “secure broad patents” and that “method of
use patent claims should be drafted broadly”).
273
See id. (suggesting that “it is a good practice to . . . envision what kind of uses, down to the
very details such as dosages, administration routes and regimens, indications, and combination
therapies, will be sought for approval at the FDA, and draft the patent claims accordingly[,]” because
“label language is not easily predicted”).
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that the FDA-approved use is within the scope of the claims274 and
simplifies the FDA’s task of discerning whether a section viii carve-out is
possible.
This proposed listing requirement may be straightforward in instances
where the FDA-approved method of use is the same or narrower in scope
than the patent claims. Although it may appear to be more complex in
instances where the FDA-approved use is broader than the patent claim,
the proposed listing requirement may still be viable. Consider an example
where “[t]he FDA [has] approve[d] Drug X to treat Condition Y in surgical
patients,” where surgical patients include both pre-surgical and postsurgical patients.275 The NDA filer has an Orange Book listed patent claim
for the method of using Drug X to treat Condition Y in pre-surgical
patients.276 Under the current listing practices, the NDA filer may draft a
use code for Drug X to state “treatment of Condition Y in surgical
patients”an “exact[] match[]” to the FDA-approved indication.277 This
use code would preclude an ANDA filer from a section viii statement. For
generic market entry, the only path for the ANDA filer would be to assert
the counterclaim provision to have the broad use code narrowed to the
treatment of Condition Y in pre-surgical patients.278 But before the
counterclaim can even be asserted, the ANDA filer must file a paragraph
IV certification and wait for the NDA filer to file suit.279
However, this example would play out very differently in the proposed
listing requirement regime. Under the proposed listing requirement, the
NDA filer would be precluded from using the use code “treatment of
Condition Y in surgical patients”280 even though it is an exact match to the
FDA-approved use. Because the scope of the patent claim is for pre274
Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a expressly state that submissions are made “under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing [information] is true and correct.” Patent Information Submitted
Upon and After Approval of an NDA or Supplement, FDA, 3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.fda.gov
/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/forms/ucm048345.pdf [hereinafter Form FDA 3542]; Patent
Information Submitted with the Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or Supplement, FDA (Nov. 2014), at
3, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/ UCM048352
.pdf [hereinafter Form FDA 3542a].
275
This is a hypothetical example taken from Terry G. Mahn, Drug Labeling Games – Skinny
Labels Getting an FDA Assist, PHARMACEUTICAL COMPLIANCE MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.
fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Mahn.PharmaComplianceMonitor.DrugLabelingGames%E2%80%93
SkinnyLabelsGettinganFDAAssist.March2014.pdf.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
See id. (indicating that the ANDA filer “could argue that the use code is too broad and should
be narrowed to cover only pre-surgical patients” in a paragraph IV litigation).
279
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1688 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (illustrating that “the generic manufacturer . . . submit[s] an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification [and] . . . wait[s] for the brand manufacturer to institute suit” before a counterclaim is
filed).
280
Id.
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surgical patients, the NDA filer would only be allowed to draft a use code
for Drug X for “treatment of Condition Y in pre-surgical patients.” As a
result, a section viii statement for treatment of Condition Y in post-surgical
patients is not foreclosed to ANDA filers.
The FDA may be far from adopting this listing requirement; however,
some recent activity suggests a slight shift toward this standard. In
November 2013, the FDA revised the Information and Instructions for
Patent Information Submitted Upon and After Approval of an NDA or
Supplement (Form FDA 3542) and Patent Information Submitted with the
Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or Supplement (Form FDA 3542a).281
Although the fields that require information on both forms were not
changed, the instructions accompanying the method of use information
were altered. The revised instructions for section 4.2a in both Form FDA
3542 and Form FDA 3542a state that the NDA filer should “[i]dentify the
precise words of the approval labeling that describe with specificity the
patented method of use.”282 Prior to this revision, the section 4.2a for Form
FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a stated that the NDA filer should
“[s]pecify the part of the proposed drug labeling that is claimed by the
patent.”283 Some commentators suggest that this revision may be an effort
by the FDA “to bring more order to use code issues examined in [Caraco
v. Novo Nordisk].”284 Although this instructional revision does not by any
means suggest that the FDA requires the use code to be identical to the
approved method of use or indication, it may compel the NDA filer to
examine the approved method of use and patent claims with more
particularity than before.285
This increase in the number of use codes is not necessarily
problematic. In recent years, the average number of use codes in the
Orange Book has grown by ninety-eight use codes per year.286 To date,
there are approximately 1,411 use codes published in the Orange Book.287
281

Form FDA 3542, supra note 274, at 4; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 4.
Form FDA 3542, supra note 274, at 4; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 4.
283
FDA Revises Forms for Submission of Patent Information to the Orange Book: Federal Circuit
Decision in Novartis AG v. Lee Alters Patent Term Adjustment, HOGAN LOVELLS PHARMACEUTICAL
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY ALERT (Feb. 26, 2014), http://ehoganlovells.com/rv/ff00159909f14
81b42df376f3f4c9382a7182abe.
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Id.
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Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a explicitly state that the NDA Applicant “verif[ies]
under penalty of perjury that the [application information] is true and correct.” Form FDA 3542, supra
note 274, at 3; Form FDA 3542a, supra note 274, at 3.
286
The average growth in number of use codes was based on the growth in number of use codes
for years 2011, 2012, and 2013, determined to be 78, 104, and 117, respectively. See Kurt R. Karst,
Updated Analysis Shows Patent Use Codes Have Nearly Tripled Since 2003, FDA L. BLOG (July 8,
2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/07/updated-analysis-shows-pate
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This growing number of use codes may increase the likelihood of ANDA
filers employing the counterclaim provision.288 This proposition, of course,
is highly dependent on the manner in which the use codes were
draftedduly tailored to the approved method of use or broadly
described.289 The increase in use codes as a result of adopting the listing
regimewhere the use code must be identical to the FDA-approved
method of use, provided that it is within the scope of the claimswould
effectively make the use codes specific and precise and would reduce the
use of the counterclaim provision.
Given the longstanding view of the FDA’s ministerial role, perhaps the
FDA may be more likely to institute a change in listing requirements rather
than a proactive use code evaluation. Although changes in listing
requirements may still require an increase in the number of hours per Form
FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a,290 it may be the least burdensome
measure for the agency to implement relative to actively policing the
Orange Book use code submissions and amendments or implementing an
administrative Orange Book correction “challenge,” which would require
substantially more staff and hours dedicated to use code review.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the FDA continues to maintain its longstanding view of having
only a “ministerial” role in managing the accuracy of use codes in the
Orange Booka pivotal publication for the prescription drug
industryand no substantive delisting or correction mechanism is
available, generic companies that wish to simply file a section viii
statement are faced with only one path for use code correctionsthe
counterclaim provision. To employ the counterclaim provision, generics
must face paragraph IV litigation, which is procedurally cumbersome and
costly. The counterclaim provision is not an effective patch on a procedural
hole; it is not a fix.
To clarify issues with regard to listing practices, the FDA has
implemented its “final rule” and instituted declaration forms.
Unfortunately, this “final rule” and current guidelines are “remarkably
opaque.”291 The lack of oversight of a crucial publicationthe Orange
Bookis a source of frustration in facilitating the entry of generic drugs
288

Id.
Id.
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See 78 Fed. Reg. 57,165 (Sept. 17, 2013) (reporting on the number of total hours spent and the
“[a]verage burden per response” for Form FDA 3542 and Form FDA 3542a).
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See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“Precisely because the regulatory scheme depends on the accuracy and precision of use
codes, I find FDA’s guidance as to what is required of brand manufacturers in use codes remarkably
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into the healthcare market. Many commentators agree that policing the
Orange Book is needed while others feel that this creates a burden on the
FDA. However, there is agreement that the current regime is insufficient.
Although it may be burdensome at this time for the FDA to bear total
responsibility for policing the Orange Book, an elevated oversight, a
change in listing requirements, or at least a modification to the guidelines
provided by the FDA is much needed.

